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According to neoclassical economics, the most efficient way to organize hu-
man activity is to use the free market. By stoking self interest, the theory claims,
individuals can benefit society. This idea, however, conflicts with the evolution-
ary theory of multilevel selection, which proposes that rather than stoke indi-
vidual self interest, successful groups must suppress it.
Which theory better describes how human societies develop? I seek to an-
swer this question by studying the opposite of the market: namely hierarchy. I
find evidence that as human societies develop, they turn increasingly to hier-
archical organization. Yet they do so, paradoxically, at the same time that the
language of free markets becomes more common, and culture becomes more
individualistic.
This evidence, I argue, contradicts free-market theory, but only if we treat it
as a scientific doctrine. If instead we treat free-market theory as an ideology, the
pieces come together. Free-market thinking, I speculate, may stoke the forma-
tion of hierarchy by cloaking power in the language of ‘freedom’.
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1 Free-market theory in an evolutionary context
There is perhaps nothing more central to mainstream economics than the belief
in free markets. The idea is seductively simple. Guided only by self-interest, in-
dividuals can act through the market to benefit the whole of society. This notion
of the ‘invisible hand’ (Smith, 1776) has become foundational to neoclassical
economics. The theory proposes that in a perfectly competitive market, the au-
tonomous actions of selfish individuals will lead to an outcome that is ‘Pareto
optimum’ (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). In this situation, no person can be made
better off without making at least one person worse off.
The neoclassical theory of free markets is not without critics. Heterodox po-
litical economists have pointed out many flaws, mostly related to the theory’s
unrealistic assumptions (Hunt, 2011; Keen, 2001; Keen and Standish, 2006;
Lee and Keen, 2004; Means, 1992; Mirowski, 1991; Nitzan and Bichler, 2009;
Pullen, 2009; Robinson, 1962; Sraffa, 1960; Veblen, 1898). My goal here, how-
ever, is not to revisit this debate, but instead to broaden it. The neoclassical
theory of free markets is, at its core, a theory of how human groups should or-
ganize. It postulates that groups can organize effectively using decentralized
competition, and that the selfish actions of individuals can benefit the group.
Yet this theory contradicts, in almost every detail, the modern evolutionary un-
derstanding of how social organisms function.
According to the theory of multilevel selection, social organisms face a fun-
damental dilemma. Actions that are best for the group rarely maximize relative
fitness of individuals within the group (Sober and Wilson, 1999; Wilson and
Gowdy, 2015; Wilson and Sober, 1989, 1994; Wilson and Wilson, 2007). This
creates a tension between the self-interest of individuals and the interest of the
group. To resolve this tension, social organisms find ways to suppress the self-
interest of individuals. How they do so is an open question. But evolutionary
history reveals a common trend. As groups become larger and more complex,
they tend to become more hierarchical (Sec. 2).
In this evolutionary context, the theory of free markets is an outlier. It posits
that, contrary to what we observe among other social organisms, humans need
not suppress self-interest to organize in large groups. And we need not use
hierarchical organization. We can build complex societies, the theory claims,
using decentralized competition.
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My goal here is to test this claim. I look for evidence that human societies
remain decentralized as they industrialize (Sec. 3). I find little evidence that
this is true. Instead, the data suggests that to industrialize, human societies
turn to hierarchical organization. As energy use increases, governments tend to
get larger and the relative number of managers tends to grow (Sec. 3.4).
To explain this evidence, I develop a formal model of institutional hierarchy
(Sec. 3.5). The model assumes that institutions are hierarchically organized,
and that they grow larger as energy use increases. After validating this ‘energy-
hierarchy’ model, I use it to infer how the ‘degree of hierarchy’ (Sec. 3.2) within
societies varies with economic development. The results are unambiguous: as
societies consume more energy, they appear to become more hierarchical (Sec.
3.6).
This growth of hierarchy seems to contradict the neoclassical theory of free
markets. Societies do not (as the theory claims they should) use small-scale
competition to develop. Still more puzzling, I find that the growth of hierarchy
may be associated with the spread of free-market ideas (Sec. 4). Looking at
the United States, I find that as government grew and the number of managers
increased, free-market jargon became more popular (Sec. 4.1). Moreover, inter-
national evidence suggests that cultures that are more individualistic and more
tolerant of deviant behavior are, at the same time, more hierarchical (Sec. 4.3).
To make sense of this paradox, I speculate that free-market theory may ac-
tually stoke the growth of hierarchy. It does so, I propose, by treating firms (not
individuals) as the unit of competition. This focus legitimizes the firm as an au-
tonomous unit, while leaving the firm’s internal structure as a ‘black box’. By
championing firm autonomy, free-market theory may legitimize the firm’s inter-
nal chain of command, thereby justifying the accumulation of power.
If this idea is correct, it leads to a radical way of integrating free-market ideas
with the theory of multilevel selection. The two schools may not be competing
scientific hypotheses. Instead, neoclassical economics may be best treated as
a belief system whose existence should be explained using the tools of cultural
evolution.
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2 The great debate: hierarchy vs. the free market
Hierarchy is to free markets what light is to darkness: namely, the polar oppo-
site. Free markets decentralize control. Hierarchies centralize it. Free markets
promote autonomy. Hierarchies promote subservience. The two forms of organi-
zation, it seems, could not be more different.
Economists have long recognized this fact. But rather than study the differ-
ences between hierarchy and the market, mainstream economists have opted
instead to pass judgment. The dominant school in economics — neoclassical
theory — claims that outcomes from perfectly competitive markets are ‘opti-
mal’, whereas outcomes from centralized control are ‘inefficient’ (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2001).
I find this response problematic. It is much like if biologists deemed single-
celled organisms to be ‘optimal’, but deemed multicellular organisms ‘ineffi-
cient’. This conclusion misses the point. The two forms of life are simply dif-
ferent. What is interesting is not whether one form is ‘better’ than the other, but
why the two forms of life exist, how they evolved, and where evolution is headed.
I propose that by taking this wider evolutionary perspective, we can better
understand the debate between free markets versus hierarchy. The question we
should ask is — what is the direction of human social evolution? Towards less
hierarchy? Or towards more of it?
2.1 Hierarchy in an evolutionary context
Before we look at the direction of hierarchy among human societies, we should
look first at the big picture. Let’s review the role of hierarchy in the evolution of
life on Earth.
Hierarchical structure is ubiquitous in the natural world — so much so that
the social scientist Herbert Simon proposed that hierarchy is the ‘architecture
of complexity’ (1991). The idea is that complex systems are built by merging
simpler components, creating a hierarchy of sub-systems (Annila and Kuisma-
nen, 2009). Along with this hierarchy of structure, Simon argued, comes a
hierarchy of control. Complex biological systems are generally not composed
of autonomous subcomponents. Instead, as complexity grows, subcomponents
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surrender autonomy to a centralized system of command and control.
The evolution of life on Earth supports Simon’s idea that hierarchy is the
‘architecture of complexity’. Through a series of ‘major evolutionary transitions’,
life has grown more complex (Smith and Szathmary, 1997). Although different
in form, each transition appears to obey the same principle: complex structure
grows from the merger of simpler sub-units.
Life began, we presume, when organic molecules assembled into larger en-
tities. The basic structure that emerged — and remains to this day — is that
of the prokaryotic cell. In the next major transition, eukaryotic cells evolved
(we believe) from the merger of two prokaryotic cells — a bacterium and an ar-
chaeon (López-García et al., 2017; López-García and Moreira, 1999; Margulis,
1981; Sagan, 1967). The bacterium became the mitochondria of modern eu-
karyotes, while the archaeon became the cytoplasm and nucleus. In the next
transition, eukaryotic cells evolved into multicellular organisms — a symbiosis
that seems to have happened multiple times (Grosberg and Strathmann, 2007).
In the last major transition, solitary organisms evolved into ‘eusocial’ species
that cooperate in large groups (Nowak et al., 2010; West et al., 2015; Wilson
and Hölldobler, 2005). With their large colonies and intricate caste structure,
the social insects (ants, bees, termites) are the most conspicuous example of this
eusociality. Some scientists believe that modern humans may be the latest ad-
dition to the eusocial club (Gowdy and Krall, 2013, 2014; Richerson and Boyd,
1998; Turchin, 2013).
Looking at these major transitions, we see that they obey the two principles
of hierarchy. First, more complex structure is built from simpler components.
Second, the growth of complexity seems to involve the centralization of control.
Let’s begin with the nesting aspect of hierarchy, which we see everywhere
in life. Eukaryotic cells, for instance, are built from simpler organelles (i.e. the
nucleus and mitochondria). Multicellular organisms, in turn, are built from sim-
pler cells. And eusocial colonies are built from individual organisms. Each new
layer of complexity, it seems, is assembled by merging simpler components.
This nested hierarchy, Herbert Simon proposes, occurs through a process of
evolutionary problem solving (Herbert, 1962). Structures evolve that solve spe-
cific problems. The cell, for instance, solves the problem of separating ‘living’
matter from ‘non-living’ matter. Once this problem is solved, the newly created
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structure serves as the building block to solve new problems. Eukaryotic cells
built on the structure of prokaryotes to solve a new problem — one of energet-
ics. When bacterium evolved into eukaryotic mitochondria, they shed most of
their DNA, freeing up more energy for protein synthesis (Lane, 2011; Lane and
Martin, 2010). This free energy may be what allowed eukaryotes to grow more
complex than their prokaryotic counterparts (Lane, 2014, 2015).
In addition to hierarchy in the ‘nesting’ sense, the evolution of life also fol-
lows the principle of hierarchy in the sense of centralized control. Large, complex
organisms are not composed of autonomous units. Instead, the growth of com-
plexity seems to involve the gradual loss of autonomy among sub-units, and the
growth of centralized control. The eukaryotic cell, for instance, is not composed
of autonomous organelles. Instead, sub-units are governed by a ‘command and
control center’ — the nucleus (Pennisi, 2004). Similarly, multicellular animals
have evolved centralized control in the form of the nervous system (Arendt et al.,
2008). Eusocial insects have elaborate caste systems in which most individuals
surrender their reproductive capacity to a single queen (although the queen does
not, in turn, directly control workers) (O’Donnell, 1998; Shimoji et al., 2014).
Humans (who are possibly the latest eusocial species) also organize using hier-
archy. Evidence suggests that as societies become more populous, they add new
layers of administrative hierarchy (Turchin, 2010; Turchin and Gavrilets, 2009).
The use of centralized control may arise for two (related) reasons. First, as-
sembling a larger system from many smaller components requires coordination.
Although decentralized coordination may be possible, it seems that organization
within (and among) living things usually involves some degree of centralization.
Second, there is the problem of the ‘self-interest’ of sub-units. The major
evolutionary transitions happened by merging sub-units that were previously
autonomous. According to the theory of multilevel selection, this merger is not
possible unless the ‘self-interest’ of sub-units is suppressed (Okasha, 2005; Wil-
son, 1997; Wilson et al., 2008). That is because there is often an evolutionary
conflict between the ‘interest’ of the group versus the ‘interest’ of individuals
within the group (Sober and Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Gowdy, 2015; Wilson
and Sober, 1989, 1994; Wilson and Wilson, 2007).1
1Note that the words ‘interest’ and ‘self-interest’ do not indicate intent. Rather, they are a
Darwinian metaphor for actions that increase relative ‘fitness’ (differential reproduction). Also,
multilevel selection theory notes that the ‘suppression’ of self interest (when it occurs) is always
partial and never complete.
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To understand this conflict, recall that natural selection rewards differential
reproduction — what biologists call ‘fitness’. In many scenarios, what is ‘fit’ for
individuals is not ‘fit’ for the group. Take human warfare as an example. For the
group (an army), it is best if all soldiers charge into battle cohesively. But for an
individual within the group, the best strategy is to run away from the frontline
(Fix, 2019b).
So here we have a conflict between levels of selection. By deserting, an in-
dividual soldier can reduce their chance of death (hence, increase their fitness).
However, if too many soldiers desert, the army collapses (hence, the group’s
fitness decreases). To succeed in battle, the group must therefore suppress the
self-interest (relative fitness) of deserters.2
Multilevel vs. gene-centric selection
The theory of multilevel selection argues that successful groups must suppress
natural selection at lower levels of organization. Since this claim remains con-
troversial, it is worth discussing problems with the alternative view. According
to orthodox Darwinism, all aspects of evolution can be reduced to competition
between genes.
Popularized by Richard Dawkins (1976), the gene-centric argument is con-
vincingly simple. If an organism outbreeds its competitors, the organism’s genes
also win. It seems, therefore, that higher levels of selection are not needed to ex-
plain the evolution of organized groups. Instead, complex structure arises solely
from the ‘self-interest’ of genes.
While at first convincing, this argument makes a subtle philosophical mis-
take. It assumes that a successful reduction (breaking a system into parts) implies
a successful resynthesis (using the parts to rebuild the system). Often, however,
reduction is a one-way street. Given a complex system, we can break it into
parts. But we cannot take the parts (alone) and rebuild the system.
As an example of this asymmetry, consider human travel. If I board an air-
plane to Tokyo, we know that the atoms in my body did the same thing. To
paraphrase Richard Feynman, we can state unequivocally that ‘everything that
2Armies often suppress the motive to desert by making it a capital crime. The certain threat
of capital punishment makes the possible threat of battlefield death the lesser of two evils.
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I do, my atoms do’.3Unfortunately, this reduction tells us nothing about why I
went to Tokyo. It turns out that I had a job interview — something that is easy
to understand by looking at a higher level of organization (the individual). But
if we try to derive ‘job interviews’ from atomic physics, we will get nowhere.
The same principle holds in evolution. We can always reduce evolution to
competition among genes. Often, however, we cannot start with genes (alone)
and resynthesize the evolution of higher-level structure. Interestingly, this asym-
metry is evident in Richard Dawkin’s exposition of gene-centric theory. He notes
that organisms are ‘vehicles’ for genes. But he does not explain how these vehi-
cles came to exist.
On that front, how did multicellular organisms evolve? From the gene’s eye
view, we are faced with a paradox. Given atomistic competition between cells,
one would expect that natural selection would suppress the evolution of multi-
cellularity, and instead favor the evolution of cancer. That is because cancerous
cells outreproduce normal cells. Cancer should therefore be favored by natural
selection. So multicellularity (as we know it) should not exist.
Since multicellular organisms do exist, this logic must have a flaw. To see it,
however, we need to leave the gene’s eye view and instead look at higher levels
of selection. When cells began to organize in groups, selection at the multicel-
lular level began to override selection at the cell level. That created pressure to
suppress cancer. The reason is simple: cancer tends to kill multicellular organ-
isms. Hence at the organism level, cancer is selected against. This higher-level
selection allowed mechanisms (such as the immune system) to evolve that sup-
press somatic (cell-level) evolution (Aktipis, 2016). In this light, cancer is not
a ‘disease’ so much as a failure of the organism — a “failure of multicellular
systems to suppress somatic evolution” (Nedelcu, 2020).
To wrap up this discussion, orthodox Darwinism reduces evolution to the
spread of genes — something that can always be done in hindsight. In con-
trast, multilevel selection theory tries to resynthesize complex systems by under-
standing the tug-of-war between different levels of selection. The key insight
of multilevel selection theory is that high-level organization requires high-level
selection that suppresses selection at lower levels. Among multicellular animals,
3Speaking about the importance of the atomic theory of matter as the basis of other fields,
Richard Feynman remarked: “The most important hypothesis in all of biology, for example, is
that everything that animals do, atoms do” (Feynman et al., 2013, emphasis in original).
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organism-level selection suppresses cell-level selection. And among social ani-
mals, group-level selection suppresses individual-level selection.
Hierarchy as a tool for suppressing lower-level selection
Multilevel selection theory does not specify the mechanisms that suppress lower
levels of selection. But the properties of biological systems suggest that hierarchy
may be a common solution.
Looking at the major evolutionary transitions, John Stewart argues that
successful groups suppress lower levels of selection by turning to top-down
‘management’ (Stewart, 2019a,b, 2020). In this sense, large-scale organization
(whether of molecules, cells, or organisms) is accomplished by integrating sub-
units into a hierarchical control structure.
Whether complex organization requires hierarchy is an open question. But it
does seem that complexity and hierarchy go hand in hand.
2.2 A clash of theories: To suppress or stoke self-interest
The major transitions in evolution suggest that hierarchy is an important tool for
organizing complex living systems. Might the same principle be true in human
societies? If so, then as societies become more complex, they should also become
more hierarchical.
Returning to economics, this evolutionary prediction puts free-market theory
on its head. That’s because according to the neoclassical theory of free markets,
hierarchy is unnecessary for group organization. Instead, neoclassical theory
argues that humans can organize effectively without any form of centralized
control. All that is needed is a competitive market.
To arrive at this conclusion, neoclassical theory argues that groups can orga-
nize by stoking self-interest. If each person acts selfishly, they will be led ‘as if
by an invisible hand’ to benefit the whole society. First proposed by Adam Smith
(1776), this idea is now a central tenet of mainstream economics, formalized
in the ‘first fundamental theorem of welfare economics’. The theorem claims
that under conditions of perfect competition (in which all firms are ‘price tak-
ers’), markets will allocate resources in a way that is ‘Pareto efficient’ (Mas-Colell
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et al., 1995). In this situation, no person can be made better off without making
at least one person worse off.
With their welfare theorem in hand, neoclassical economists look at hierar-
chical organization and see an ‘inefficient’ system. Yet when biologists look at
the same system, they see an ‘effective’ group-level adaptation. So it seems that
we have a clash of theories.
Given this clash, it is easy to get bogged down in debates about which form
of organization (hierarchy or market) is ‘best’. I think that is a mistake. Instead,
we should ask an a priori question: when it comes to human social evolution,
what is the trend? Towards less hierarchy? Or more?
3 The growth of hierarchy with economic development
To shed light on the debate between economic theory and evolutionary theory,
I attempt to measure how human social hierarchy varies with economic devel-
opment. Ideally, we could study this variation in three steps:
1. Postulate a measure of social hierarchy
2. Apply this measure to human society
3. See how hierarchy varies with economic development
In principle, this method is straightforward. We treat human relations as a
network, and then measure the structure of this network. The more ‘tree-like’
the network structure, the greater the ‘degree of hierarchy’.
While simple in principle, this straight-ahead approach is difficult in prac-
tice. The problem is that the relevant data — the network structure of an entire
society — does not exist. Yes, we have data for many social networks, espe-
cially those on modern social media. But this data is insufficient for the task
I propose. Instead, what we need is detailed information about the chain of
command within every firm and every level of government. It is these formal
work relations, I argue, that are most important for measuring the hierarchical
structure of society.
Unfortunately, we do not have this chain-of-command information — not for
a single country, let alone many. Given this lack of data, how can we proceed?
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My solution is to use an indirect approach:
1. Postulate a metric of social hierarchy
2. Apply this metric to human society by simulating the required data
3. Infer how hierarchy varies with economic development
The difference here is in step 2. Rather than using direct data for the network
structure of society (which does not exist), I use an evidence-based model to
simulate this data.
Here, then, is the road ahead. After clarifying my choice of social network
(Sec. 3.1), I outline two metrics of hierarchy (Sec. 3.2). I then discuss how
I measure ‘economic development’ (Sec. 3.3). Next, I look at empirical trends
that plausibly relate to social hierarchy (Sec. 3.4). I then use this evidence to
build a formal model of how social hierarchy varies with economic development
(Sec. 3.5). Finally, I use this ‘energy-hierarchy model’ to simulate the network
structure of real-world societies. The result is a model-based inference of how
hierarchy varies with economic development (Sec. 3.6).
3.1 Which social network to measure
To investigate how social hierarchy varies with economic development, we must
first define the social network we want to quantify. Since humans form many
types of social relations, there are a variety of ways to define this network.
(Some possibilities include networks of family, friends, social media followers,
colleagues, travel, trade, etc.) How should we decide which network is relevant?
Since my focus is on hierarchy as it applies to neoclassical economics, it is
this theory that (rightly or wrongly) defines the social network of interest. In
neoclassical economics, there are two basic units of organization — one for ‘pro-
duction’ and one for ‘consumption’. Production is done by firms. Consumption
is done by consumers. The loose network that binds these two forms of organi-
zation is called the ‘market’.
Now here is what interests me. Between these two units of organization
(firms and consumers), there is an asymmetry. Consumers are individuals. But
firms are groups. Even more interesting is the fact that in neoclassical theory, the
internal structure of firms goes undescribed. Firms are treated as ‘black boxes’ —
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featureless organizations defined only by their inputs and outputs. This asym-
metry leads to two questions:
1. Why is the default unit of production the firm, not the individual?
2. Why is the internal structure of firms left undescribed?
The first question has a simple answer. Economists focus on firms (as a unit of
production) because this is simply how humans organize. While it is conceivable
to have capitalism without firms, such a society has never existed. So economists
take the real-world as a given. Firms exist.
This practical response, however, leads to more questions. Why do firms
exist? To answer this question, we need to open up the firm. Yet neoclassical
economics refuses to do so. Why? The answer, I believe, is sociological. When
you open up a firm, you realize that it is not a market. It is a hierarchy (Leiben-
stein, 2013; Marglin, 1974).
It is by studying this hierarchical structure of firms (and governments) that
I propose we measure the ‘degree of hierarchy’ in human society. Think of firms
as islands of hierarchy in a free-market sea. If firms did not exist, all business
relations would be organized via the market. Hence there would be no hierar-
chy. But as firms (and governments) emerge and grow larger, we find islands
of hierarchy within the market. It is this patchwork of firm and governmental
hierarchy that I wish to quantify.
3.2 Measuring the degree of hierarchy
To measure variation in social hierarchy, we need a way to quantify the ‘degree
of hierarchy’ in a network. I use two different metrics:
1. the concentration of hierarchical power (CHP)
2. global reaching centrality (GRC)
Before describing these metrics, it is worth visualizing what a simple hierar-
chy looks like. As illustrated in Figure 1, a hierarchy is a type of network that has
a tree-like structure. The more a network converges to this tree-like structure,
the greater its degree of hierarchy.
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Figure 1: A social network with a hierarchical structure
As illustrated here, a hierarchy is a form of network that has a tree-like structure. In
a human hierarchy, this network delineates a chain of command, in which ‘superiors’
command ‘subordinates’. As one moves up the hierarchy, the total number of subordi-
nates under one’s control tends to increase. Here, for instance, the red individual has 6
subordinates in total. The leader of the hierarchy, in contrast, has 30 subordinates.
The concentration of hierarchical power (CHP)
In a hierarchy, decision-making authority flows from the top down. The result
is that individuals at the top of the hierarchy have more power than those at
the bottom — they have more ability to impose their will upon others (Bendix,
1998).
The concept of ‘power’ provides a way to quantify the degree of hierarchy
in a social network. We start by noting that within a network, an individual’s
power increases as they accumulate more subordinates (people who obey their
command). I propose that the distribution of control over subordinates indicates
the ‘degree of hierarchy’ in the network. The idea is simple. When no one has
any subordinates, there is no hierarchy. But when a few individuals have many
subordinates, the network is extremely hierarchical.
With this thinking in mind, I use the concentration of ‘hierarchical power’ as
a measure of the degree of hierarchy. I start by defining ‘hierarchical power’ as
an individual’s control over subordinates. Formally, the hierarchical power (P)
of the ith person in a network is proportional to the total number of subordinates
(Ns) they control:
P(i) = Ns(i)+1 (1)
I add ‘1’ to the number of subordinates to symbolize that all individuals retain
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control of at least one person — themselves.
For an example calculation, let’s return to Figure 1. Here the red individual
has 2 direct subordinates and 4 indirect subordinates. With 6 subordinates in
total, this person has a hierarchical power of P = 7. Individuals higher up the
hierarchy have still more power. In Figure 1, the leader of the hierarchy has 30
subordinates, giving a hierarchical power of P = 31.
Having defined the hierarchical power of an individual, we can apply this
measure to everyone in a network. The result will be a distribution of hierarchi-
cal power. We can then use this distribution to quantify the ‘degree of hierarchy’.
The more concentrated the distribution of hierarchical power, the more hierar-
chical the network.
To measure the concentration of hierarchical power, I use the Gini index —
a standard measure of inequality. Formally, the ‘concentration of hierarchical
power’ (CHP) is the Gini index of the hierarchical power (P) of all N individuals
in a network:
CHP = G(P1, P2, . . . , PN ) (2)
The CHP varies between 0 (no hierarchy) and 1 (absolute hierarchy). As
an example, the network in Figure 1 has CHP = 0.57, indicating that it is quite
hierarchical.4
Global reaching centrality (GRC)
Another approach to measuring hierarchy is to define something called ‘global
reaching centrality’ (Mones et al., 2012; Nepusz and Vicsek, 2013). When ap-
plied to human networks, this metric again involves counting subordinates. To
measure ‘global reaching centrality’, we first define ‘local reaching centrality’
(CR). This is the number of subordinates Ns controlled by the ith individual, ex-





4Note that because the minimum hierarchical power is defined to be 1 (not 0), the concen-
tration of hierarchical power can never be exactly 1.
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Returning to Figure 1, let’s calculate CR for the red individual. This person
has 6 subordinates within a network of N = 31 people. Their local reaching
centrality is therefore CR= 6/30= 0.2.
The ‘global reaching centrality’ (GRC) of the network is then defined as the
sum of the differences between the local reaching centrality of each person and









The GRC can range from 0 (no hierarchy) to 1 (absolute hierarchy). As an
example, the network in Figure 1 has a GRC = 0.92, suggesting that it is quite
hierarchical.
3.3 Measuring economic development
Having defined how I measure hierarchy, I turn now to how I measure economic
development. When economists speak of ‘development’, they usually mean the
growth of ‘real GDP’. In this paper, however, I use a different metric. I measure
economic development in terms of energy use per person.
I have two reasons for using energy to measure development. First, there are
many ‘aggregation problems’ inherent in the calculation of real GDP (Fix, 2019a;
Fix et al., 2019). These problems occur largely (but not exclusively) because real
GDP is based on the unit of prices, which are unstable. This instability introduces
ambiguity in the value of real GDP.
Second, I use energy consumption to measure ‘economic development’ be-
cause I want a method that generalizes beyond human societies. If the growth
of human hierarchy is an extension of a general evolutionary process, then we
want a metric of ‘development’ that is universal. Since real GDP has no meaning
outside the human economy, it is not helpful. Energy, however, is a ‘universal
currency’ in the natural sciences (Chaisson, 2005).
The importance of energy stems from basic thermodynamics. It is the flow
of energy that makes complex structure possible. Without energy flows, natu-
ral systems converge to equilibrium — a state where nothing happens on the
macro scale. But when there is an energy gradient, macro-level structures tend
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to emerge — structures that dissipate energy more rapidly (Kondepudi and Pri-
gogine, 1998).
A convection cell, driven by a temperature gradient within a fluid, is a simple
example of such a ‘dissipative structure’. Living organisms are a more complex
example, driven by the energy flow from the sun (Annila and Annila, 2008;
Boltzmann, 2011; Chaisson, 2002; Schrodinger, 1992). The human economy
is still more complex, but obeys the same principle. It is a dissipative structure
driven by flows of energy (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Giampietro et al., 2012).
Because of its role in driving complex systems, I use energy consumption as
a measure of economic development.5
3.4 Evidence for the growth of hierarchy
My goal is ultimately to use my metrics of hierarchy (Sec. 3.2) to measure how
the ‘degree of hierarchy’ varies with economic development. Unfortunately, the
data needed to achieve this goal does not yet exist. As such, I will take an indirect
route to measuring hierarchy.
I will first review evidence suggesting that hierarchy varies with economic de-
velopment. In the section that follows, I show that as societies use more energy,
governments tend to get larger and the number of managers tends to increase.
I then use this evidence to build a formal model of hierarchy (Sec. 3.5), which
I use to infer how the ‘degree of hierarchy’ varies with economic development
(Sec. 3.6).
The size of government
In neoclassical economics, government is a necessary evil. It is a form of hierar-
chical organization that must exist, but should not grow too large.
Government must exist, Milton Friedman observes, to “do something that
the market cannot do for itself, namely, to determine, arbitrate, and enforce the
rules of the game” (1962). But while government is a prerequisite for markets,
5If one is skeptical of this choice, note that there is strong correlation between energy use
and real GDP (Brown et al., 2011). As such, should we measure economic development using
real GDP, the results in this paper would likely remain unchanged.
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it is also the market’s enemy. That is because, as Franklin Fisher notes, “the
principal policy insight of economics [is] that a competitive price system pro-
duces desirable results and that government interference will generally lead to
an inefficient allocation of resources” (1987).
In neoclassical theory, then, government is a necessary form of hierarchy, but
one that should remain as small as possible. It seems, however, that real-world
societies do not listen to this ‘small government’ principle. Instead, economic
development goes hand in hand with larger governments.
Figure 2 shows the evidence across (and within) countries. I plot here the
employment share of government as it relates to energy use per capita. (‘Gov-
ernment’ is defined as the entire public sector. Each line in Fig. 2 represents the
path through time of a specific country.) While country-level trends vary, the
overall pattern is clear. As energy use increases, governments tend to get larger.
From a neoclassical standpoint, this result is unexpected. If markets are
‘efficient’, why does economic development involve government encroachment
on the private sector? One possibility is that governments are not heeding
economists’ advice, and that societies would be better off if government re-
mained small. If so, then it is politics that are driving the growth of government.
To investigate the role of politics, let us turn to Figure 3. Here I replot the
data from Figure 2, but this time I differentiate between two types of countries:
1. Countries that have (or once had) a communist government
2. Countries that have never had a communist government
It is easy to see the difference between the two types of countries. Those that
have had communist regimes tend to have larger governments than those that
have not.6
Given the intense 20th-century battle between capitalism and communism,
it is unsurprising that politics affect the size of government. What is surpris-
6On a historical note, the data in Figure 3 captures the collapse of the Soviet Union in action.
The data begins in 1990, just when the Soviet Union disbanded. Former Soviet states like the
Ukraine, Estonia, Moldova and Armenia begin (in 1990) with almost 100% government em-
ployment — a relic of their communist history. But over the next decade, governments in these
countries shrank drastically, collapsing to levels similar to their non-communist counterparts.
With this government collapse came a decline in energy use.
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Figure 2: Government’s share of employment vs. energy use per capita
I define ‘government’ here as employment in the entire public sector. Lines represent the
path through time of individual countries (from 1990 to the present). Points represent
countries with a single observation. Select countries are labeled with alpha-3 codes.
The black line shows the trend across all countries, smoothed with a LOESS regression.
For data sources, see Section 6.
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Communist and Former Communist Countries Non−Communist Countries
Figure 3: Government’s share of employment vs. energy use per capita by
political spectrum
I reproduce here the data in Fig. 2, but now distinguish between communist and non-
communist countries. ‘Communist countries’ are those that have (or once had) a com-
munist regime. Lines represent the path through time of individual countries. Com-
munist countries are labeled with alpha-3 codes. The inset panel shows the smoothed
trends, calculated with a local polynomial regression. For data sources, see Section 6.
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ing, however, is that regardless of politics, governments tend to get larger as
energy use increases. The inset panel in Figure 3 shows this fact. Here I smooth
the raw data (within each type of country) using a local polynomial regression.
The results are interesting. In both communist and non-communist countries,
governments tend to grow larger with energy use.
So yes, politics do affect the size of government. But there is also a secular
trend that is independent of political ideology — a fact that does not sit well
with the neoclassical theory of free markets. As societies develop, government
tends to grow larger.
The number of managers
Let’s turn now from the public sector to the whole economy. When describing
the economy, neoclassical economists see competition between firms. But what
about within firms? There, competition seems less salient. Once an employee
has a position within a firm, they are expected to cooperate with their coworkers.
And that usually involves taking and/or giving orders — a sign of hierarchy.
If we were to grossly simplify the structure of a firm’s hierarchy, we might
reduce it to two classes: those who take orders and those who give orders. The
order givers are usually called managers. Their job is to command the activity
of other people — a job that is unique to hierarchies. I propose, then, that the
relative number of managers in a society provides a window into the degree of
hierarchy. A society with no managers has no hierarchy. A society with many
managers has lots of hierarchy.
With this thinking in mind, Figure 4 plots the evidence. Here, I look at how
the relative number of managers (within countries) varies with energy use per
capita. As with the size of government, I find that the number of managers tends
to increase with economic development.
This evidence seems to contradict the neoclassical theory of free markets. As
societies develop, they turn increasingly to top-down management. It could be,
though, that this trend is ultimately political. In that case, politics induce the
growth of hierarchy, which then ‘distorts’ free-market efficiency.
To investigate the role of politics, let us look at Figure 5. Here I replot the
trend between the number of managers and energy use per capita. But this
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Figure 4: Managers’ share of employment vs. energy use per capita
I plot here the international trend between the number of managers in a country (as a
share of total employment) and energy use per capita. Lines represent the path through
time of individual countries (from 1990 to the present). I have labeled select countries
with alpha-3 codes. The black line shows the trend across all countries, smoothed with
a LOESS regression. For data sources, see Section 6.
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Communist and Former Communist Countries Non−Communist Countries
Figure 5: Managers’ share of employment vs. energy use per capita by
political spectrum
I reproduce here the data in Fig. 4, but now distinguish between communist and non-
communist countries. ‘Communist countries’ are those that have (or once had) a com-
munist regime. Lines represent the path through time of individual countries. Com-
munist countries are labeled with alpha-3 codes. The inset panel shows the smoothed
trends, calculated with a local polynomial regression. For data sources, see Section 6.
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time I differentiate between communist/non-communist politics. The results
are telling. Unlike with the size of government, politics seem to have no effect
on the number of managers. The inset panel in Figure 5 emphasizes this non-
distinction. Here I show the smoothed trend across countries, differentiated by
political regime. There is virtually no difference between communist and non-
communist countries. So whatever is driving the growth of managers, it is not
overtly political.
3.5 An energy-hierarchy model
As societies consume more energy, governments tend to get larger and the num-
ber of managers increases. This evidence hints that economic development in-
volves the growth of hierarchy.
To gain more insight into these changes, I now develop a formal model of
how social hierarchy varies with energy consumption (my measure of economic
development). The model is based on two assumptions:
1. Human institutions are hierarchically organized
2. These institutions tend to grow larger as energy use increases
I first formalize these assumptions into a numerical model of how social hi-
erarchy changes with energy consumption. Then I use the model to predict how
the size of government and the number of managers should grow with energy
use.
The Simon-Lydall model of hierarchy
A half century ago, Herbert Simon (1957) and Harold Lydall (1959) indepen-
dently developed a model of the hierarchical structure of firms. In this model,
hierarchies have a fixed ‘span of control’, meaning all superiors control the same
number of subordinates. I will call this the ‘Simon-Lydall’ model of hierarchy’.
When Simon and Lydall first proposed the model, little was known about how
firms were actually structured. Today, we know more about firm hierarchies,
and we can say that Simon and Lydall were on the right track. While the span
of control is not actually constant in real-world firms, assuming it is constant is
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Figure 6: The ‘Simon-Lydall’ model of hierarchy
I show here two examples of the Simon-Lydall model of hierarchy. The model assumes
that the span of control (the number of direct subordinates controlled by each superior)
is constant within a given hierarchy. The span then determines the hierarchy’s ‘shape’.
A large span creates a ‘flat’ hierarchy — one with relatively few hierarchical ranks (left).
A small span creates a ‘steep’ hierarchy that has many ranks (right).
a reasonable simplification.7
To get a sense for the Simon-Lydall model of hierarchy, let’s look at Figure 6.
Here I visualize two modeled hierarchies, each with 31 members. The ‘shape’
of the hierarchy is determined by the span of control (which is fixed within the
hierarchy). When the span is large (left), the hierarchy is ‘flat’. When the span
is small (right), the hierarchy is ‘steep’.
The Simon-Lydall model has 3 equations. (For their derivation, see Section
6.) Consider a hierarchy with span of control s that has NT members. The







Here bc denotes rounding down to the nearest integer. Next, we define the num-
ber of people in the bottom hierarchical rank as:
7For case studies of firm hierarchy, see Audas et al., 2004; Baker et al., 1993; Dohmen et al.,
2004; Grund, 2005; Lima, 2000; Morais and Kakabadse, 2014; Treble et al., 2001. For aggregate
studies of firm hierarchy, see Ariga et al., 1992; Bell and Van Reenen, 2012; Eriksson, 1999;
Heyman, 2005; Leonard, 1990; Main et al., 1993; Mueller et al., 2016; Rajan and Wulf, 2006;
Tao and Chen, 2009. For a summary of these studies, see the Appendices in Fix, 2018, 2019c.)







Given membership in the bottom rank (N1), we then build the hierarchy from the
bottom up. The size of each consecutive hierarchical rank h (where increasing







Together, equations 5–7 define the organizational hierarchy in the Simon-
Lydall model. They take inputs of hierarchy size NT and span of control s, and
return values for the number of members Nh in each hierarchical rank.
Modeling managers
Within the Simon-Lydall model, individuals are defined only by their rank. As
such, there is no clear distinction between managers and non-managers.
To create such a distinction, I assume there is a rank threshold that divides
these two classes. I define everyone in and above hierarchical rank 3 as a ‘man-
ager’. Everyone else is a ‘non-manager’. The idea here is that people in the
bottom rank are ‘shop floor’ workers. People in the second rank are ‘working
supervisors’ (Strauss, 1957). Everyone else is a professional manager. Figure 7
shows an example of this management model.
Given this definition of ‘managers’, we can define the management share of
employment within a hierarchy. This is the number of managers (M) expressed
as a fraction of hierarchy size (NT ). In a hierarchy with n ranks and span of







Note that as the number of hierarchical ranks grows large (n→∞), the man-
agement share of employment approaches an asymptote of 1/s2.
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ManagerNon-Manager
Figure 7: Managers in the Simon-Lydall model
I model ‘managers’ as everyone in hierarchical rank 3 and up. Everyone else is a ‘non-
manager’.
Energy and the size distribution of institutions
The Simon-Lydall model takes as an input the size of an institution and returns
the simulated hierarchical structure. To apply the model to a society, we must
therefore know both the size distribution of institutions, and how this distribu-
tion varies with energy use.
As a first approximation, the size distribution of institutions follows a power
law (Axtell, 2001; Gaffeo et al., 2003) that varies with energy use per capita
(Fix, 2017). Figure 8 illustrates this fact. In the main panel, I plot the average
size of firms (within countries) against energy use per capita. It is clear that
as societies use more energy, firms tend to get larger. The inset panel in Figure
8 shows how this change occurs. Here I plot the size distribution of firms as a
function of energy use. I group countries of the world by energy-use quartile,
and then plot the aggregate size distribution of firms within each group. As
energy use increases, the firm size distribution gets a fatter tail.
I model the size distribution of firms as a power law, where the probability





Here, the parameter α determines the ‘fatness’ of the distribution tail. (Smaller
α indicates a fatter tail). Table 1 shows estimates of this power-law exponent
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Figure 8: How firm size changes with energy use
This figure compares the average size of firms (within countries) to energy use per
capita. Countries are labeled with alpha-3 codes. Color indicates the energy quartile of
each country (its rank, by energy use, in a four-class quantile). The black line shows a
log-log regression, with the associated 95% confidence interval. The inset panel shows
the associated firm-size distributions. Within each energy quartile, I plot (on a log-
log scale) the aggregate size distribution of firms (i.e. the size distribution across all
countries in the quartile). For sources and methods, see Section 6.
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Q1 27.9 2.6 2.09
Q2 63.8 4.7 1.94
Q3 121.8 7.5 1.85
Q4 257.4 9.5 1.74
Notes: Statistics are for groups of countries ranked by energy-use quartile (see Fig. 8). Average
energy use is calculated as the unweighted mean of per capita energy use within each energy
quartile. Firm-size statistics are calculated on the aggregate firm-size distribution within each
energy quartile. For sources and methods, see Section 6.
across countries of the world, grouped by energy quartile. I find that as energy
use increases, α tends to decrease. This evidence suggests that the size distri-
bution of institutions can be modeled as a power-law that varies with energy
use.
Back to the Simon-Lydall model of hierarchy. Based on the evidence in Figure
8, I input to the Simon-Lydall model a size distribution of institutions drawn from
a discrete power law. To simulate changing energy use, I allow the exponent α
to vary between model iterations. I then model energy use per capita (Epc) as a
function of average firm size, N :





To set the parameters a and b, I regress Eq. 10 onto the firm-size data shown in
Figure 8.
Modeling government as the largest ‘firm’
The evidence in Figure 8 shows the size distribution of firms. But how does
government fit into the picture? I propose we model government as the largest
firm(s).
This idea is inspired not by the social sciences, but by a stunning biological
regularity. Across the entire range of life (from bacteria to large mammals) the
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abundance of organisms declines predictably with mass (Hatton et al., 2019).
Small organisms are ubiquitous. Large organisms are rare. This pattern is called
the biomass spectrum (Sprules and Barth, 2016).
To model government size, I take inspiration from this regularity amidst dif-
ference. Elephants are different than bacteria, yet their abundance is still pre-
dictable from their size. Might the same be true of government?
Yes, governments are different than other institutions. Governments can tax
their citizens, enforce laws and wage war — all things that firms cannot do.
But what if, despite these differences, governments fit into the overall size dis-
tribution of institutions? Suppose that governments behave as if they were the
largest ‘firms’. If so, then we can predict the employment share of government
from the size distribution of institutions.
With this thinking in mind, I model governments as the n largest institutions.
Formally, given a size distribution of institutions Ni, the government fraction of








Here n (the number of ‘firms’ in government’) is a free parameter.
The energy-hierarchy model
When we merge the Simon-Lydall model of hierarchy with the model of how
institution size varies with energy use, we get something that I call the energy-
hierarchy model. This is a numerical simulation of how the hierarchical structure
of society varies as energy use increases.
The energy-hierarchy model has 3 free parameters, summarized in Table 2.
We start with a size distribution of institutions, generated using a discrete power-
law distribution. (I simulate a population of 1 million institutions.) The expo-
nent of this distribution, α, varies randomly between iterations, thus producing
societies with differing institution sizes. Given an institution size distribution,
we then use the Simon-Lydall model to simulate the hierarchy within each insti-
tution. The ‘shape’ of each hierarchy is dictated by the span of control, s, which
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is constant across all institutions (but varies between model iterations). Last, we
define ‘government’ as the n largest institutions (where n varies between model
iterations).
Energy-hierarchy model predictions
The energy-hierarchy model produces the observables shown in Table 3. To test
the model, I compare the first 3 observables to real-world data. Results are
shown in Figures 9 and 10.
Let’s begin with the size of government as it relates to energy use per capita
(Fig. 9). The energy-hierarchy model predicts that governments should tend
to grow larger as energy use (my measure of economic development) increases.
There is, however, significant leeway for this trend to be pushed ‘up’ (to larger
government) or ‘down’ (to smaller government). In the energy-hierarchy model,
this leeway stems from the number of ‘firms’ in government. Adding more ‘firms’
to government increases the size of government at the given level of energy use.
I interpret the number of ‘firms’ in government as a political preference. Soci-
eties with leftist politics tend to let government do what, in right-wing societies,
would be done by private firms. In the energy-hierarchy model, a leftward shift
in politics corresponds to adding ‘firms’ to government. For instance, a health-
care ‘firm’ in a right-wing society becomes a healthcare branch of ‘government’
in a left-wing society. So moving left on the political spectrum involves adding
‘firms’ to government. Moving right involves taking ‘firms’ away from govern-
ment.
Given this interpretation, the energy-hierarchy model suggests that politics
strongly affect the size of government (something we already knew from Fig. 3).
However, the model also suggests that there is a secular trend that has little to
do with politics. Governments tend to get larger as energy use increases. In
the energy-hierarchy model, this trend stems from a change in the size distribu-
tion of institutions, of which governments are a part. Governments, the model
suggests, are riding a larger wave of institutional change.
The inset panel in Figure 9 shows how the best-fit model compares to the
smoothed trend in real-world data. (For fitting methods, see Sec. 6.) In this
model, government consists of the 87 largest institutions (out of a total of 1
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distribution of institutions (Eq.
9)
Span of control s
Determines the ‘shape’ of each
hierarchy (Eqs. 5–7)
Number of ‘firms’ in government n
Affects government share of
employment (Eq. 11)
Table 3: Observables predicted by the energy-hierarchy model
Observable Description/method
Energy use per capita
Modeled as a function of mean institution
size (Eq. 10)
Managers’ share of employment
Employment share of hierarchical ranks 3
and greater (Eq. 8)
Government share of employment
Employment share of top n institutions
(Eq. 11)
Concentration of hierarchical power (CHP)
A measure of the degree of hierarchy —
the Gini index of the hierarchical-power
distribution (Eqs. 1– 2)
Global reaching centrality (GRC)
A measure of the degree of hierarchy
(Eqs. 3–4)
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Figure 9: The modeled growth of government with energy use
This figure compares empirical and modeled trends between the government share of
employment and energy use per person. Each colored dot represents an iteration of the
energy-hierarchy model. Color indicates the number of ‘firms’ in modeled government
(the model’s sole parameter). Black points represent real-world data, with select coun-
tries labeled with alpha-3 codes. The inset panel shows the smoothed trends for the
empirical data and the best-fit model. For sources and methods, see Section 6.
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Figure 10: The modeled growth of management with energy use
This figure compares empirical and modeled trends between the management share
of employment and energy use per person. Each colored point represents an iteration
of the energy-hierarchy model, with color indicating the span of control. Black points
represent real-world data, with select countries labeled with alpha-3 codes. The inset
panel shows the smoothed trends for the empirical data and the best-fit model. For
sources and methods, see Section 6.
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million). The best-fit model closely predicts the growth of government during
initial stages of development. For large energy use, however, the model diverges
from the real-world trend. This may be because the model is wrong. Or it could
be that political preferences (for government) change with energy use. I leave
it for future research to better understand this discrepancy.
Let’s switch now to how the relative number of managers varies with energy
use (Fig. 10). The energy-hierarchy model predicts that as societies use more
energy, they should accumulate managers. The trend, however, is non-linear. In
the limit of high energy use, the managers’ share of employment plateaus. This is
a characteristic feature of the energy-hierarchy model. As societies accumulate
hierarchy, the relative number of managers approaches an asymptote of 1/s2
(where s is the span of control). This limit corresponds to a society organized in
a single hierarchy.
In the energy-hierarchy model, the managers’ share of employment is af-
fected by the span of control. A smaller span of control produces ‘steeper’ hierar-
chies with more managers. A larger span of control produces ‘flatter’ hierarchies
with fewer managers. Since the span is a free parameter, it is important to verify
that fitted values are consistent with empirical data. In Figure 10, virtually all
of the empirical data can be fitted with a span of control between 2≤ s≤ 7. I
show in Fig. 14 (Sec. 6) that this range is consistent with the existing studies of
firm hierarchy.
The inset panel in Figure 10 compares the best-fit model (which has a span
of control of s = 3.5) to the smoothed trend in real-world data. (For fitting
methods, see Sec. 6.) The fit is quite close, departing only at extremes of energy
use, where the empirical sample size is small.
To summarize, the energy-hierarchy model predicts (with reasonable accu-
racy) the growth of government and managers’ employment with energy use.
3.6 Inferring how the degree of hierarchy varies with energy use
Having validated the energy-hierarchy model, I now use it to infer how the ‘de-
gree of hierarchy’ varies with energy use.
The inference procedure is as follows. For each empirical observation (a
country in a given year), I find the model iteration that best reproduces the
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observed level of energy use and managers’ share of employment. (For fitting
methods, see Sec. 6.) I then take this model iteration, and input its simulated
data into the two metrics of hierarchy — the CHP and the GRC (Sec. 3.2). The
result is an inferred relation between energy use and the ‘degree of hierarchy’
within each country.
The model-based inferences are shown in Figure 11. Here I plot the inferred
trend between energy use per capita and the ‘degree of hierarchy’ within each
country. The main panel measures hierarchy using the concentration of hierar-
chical power (CHP), while the inset panel uses global reaching centrality (GRC).
Both metrics indicate that the degree of hierarchy tends to increase with energy
use.
Because this is a model-based inference, we should treat it with appropriate
uncertainty. Still, the results are provocative and not at all what neoclassical
economics predicts. If these estimates are correct, they suggest that societies
develop by replacing small-scale competition with large-scale hierarchy. In other
words, economic development involves the gradual death of the free market.
4 Discussion: Rethinking free-market theory
To interpret the inferred growth of hierarchy with economic development, let’s
return to the competing perspectives of multilevel selection theory and the neo-
classical theory of free markets. Which theory is consistent with the evidence?
I will start with multilevel selection theory, which argues that successful
groups must suppress the self-interest of individuals. The theory does not stip-
ulate how this suppression occurs, but evidence from evolutionary biology sug-
gests that hierarchy is a common solution. The idea is that the control structure
of hierarchy suppresses the fitness-seeking behavior of subunits, thus increasing
the fitness of the group. Perhaps something similar happens in human societies
as they develop?
If so, we can treat economic development as a type of group selection in
which larger (hierarchical) groups beat out smaller (less-hierarchical) groups.
How and why this happens is an open question (Bichler and Nitzan, 2020). Still,
the (inferred) fact that economic development involves the growth of hierarchy
is consistent with the theory of multi-level selection.
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Figure 11: The inferred degree of hierarchy vs. energy use
This figure uses the energy-hierarchy model to infer how the degree of hierarchy varies
with energy use per capita in real-world societies. The main panel measures hierarchy
using the concentration of hierarchical power. Colored lines indicate the path through
time of a country. Select countries are labeled with alpha-3 codes. The black line shows
the smoothed trend, calculated with a local polynomial regression. The inset panel mea-
sures hierarchy using global reaching centrality. For sources and methods, see Section 6.
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The same evidence, however, is difficult to interpret using the neoclassical
theory of free markets. According to this theory, small-scale competition is the
optimal form of social organization. The idea is that by stoking self-interest, free
markets maximize the welfare of society. But if this is true, why do societies turn
to hierarchy to develop?
We can rescue neoclassical theory by supposing that societies would be bet-
ter off if they reduced hierarchy. The problem is that this scenario requires a
remarkable degree of collusion. Most developed countries seem to organize in a
way that neoclassical theory says is ‘non-optimal’. But why would they do that?
It could be that politics ‘distort’ the free-market. Yet we saw in Figure 5 that po-
litical regimes have no effect on the relative number of managers. That leaves
free-market theory in an uncomfortable situation. For unknown reasons, coun-
tries of the world are pursuing a path to development that neoclassical theory
says is ‘inefficient’.
We can always appeal to ‘distortions’ to rescue neoclassical theory. But this is
what philosophers of science call an auxiliary hypothesis — an idea that is used
solely to rescue a theory from falsification (Lakatos, 1976; Popper, 1959). Worse
still, the concept of ‘distortion’ is almost impossible to test. What evidence would
show that developed economies are not distorted? According to neoclassical
theory, finding a perfectly competitive market would suffice. But that leads to
tortuous logic. Either free-market theory is both true and consistent with the
evidence, in which case we find perfect competition. Or free-market theory is
still true but inconsistent with the evidence, in which case we infer that the
economy is distorted. Either way, the theory wins.
A less tortuous alternative is to conclude that the evidence is inconsistent
with neoclassical theory. Rather than develop via the free market, societies turn
to hierarchy.
4.1 The two sides of a social-science theory
Were we studying non-human animals, we could leave the discussion at that.
The evidence favors multilevel selection theory over the neoclassical theory of
free markets. The problem, though, is that we are studying humans — an animal
whose behavior is shaped not just by instinct, by also by beliefs.
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This entangling of beliefs and behavior means that doing social science is
more complicated than doing natural science. When we evaluate a social-science
theory, not only must we study its factual merit, we must also study the theory’s
effect on behavior. Importantly, the two components of the theory need not be
consistent.
Put simply, a social-scientific theory can be factually incorrect and yet ideo-
logically potent. Take, as an example, Karl Marx’s theory of capitalism (Marx,
1867). Many critics think the theory has gaping flaws (Keen, 2001; Nitzan and
Bichler, 2009; Robinson, 1962; Samuelson, 1971). And yet virtually no one dis-
putes Marx’s impact on history. Without Marx’s ideas, there may have been no
communist revolutions. So regardless of its scientific merit, Marx’s theory had a
strong influence on human behavior.
When social-science theories are obscure, of course, we need not worry about
their ideological effect. But when a theory becomes popular — as in the case of
Marxism — we must pay attention to its effect on behavior. In the case of Marx-
ism, the effect was straightforward. Marx claimed that the injustices of capi-
talism could be solved only by communist revolution (Marx and Engels, 1967).
Inspired by Marx’s ideas, revolutionaries like Lenin and Mao did precisely what
Marx proposed — they led communist revolutions to overthrow capitalism.
When it comes to free-market theory, however, the ideological component is
less easily understood. On the face of it, free-market theory advocates atomistic
competition. Yet the theory became popular (during the 20th century) at pre-
cisely the time when small-scale competition was being replaced by large-scale
hierarchy.
Figure 12 shows this trend in the United States. Here I plot the relative
word frequency (in American written English) of four free-market terms: ‘small
business’, ‘free market’, ‘competitive market’ and ‘perfect competition’. I take this
word frequency as a measure of the prevalence of free-market ideas. Against this
word frequency, I plot our two proxies for hierarchy: the government share of
employment and the management share of employment. Over the last century,
it seems that at the same time that hierarchy grew, free-market jargon became
more common.
How should we interpret this trend? One possibility is that the spread of
free-market language was a reaction to the growth of hierarchy. After witnessing
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B. Frequency of free−market terminology vs. management employment
Figure 12: Frequency of free-market terminology in American English vs.
trends in hierarchy
This figure shows the relative frequency in American English of four free-market terms.
Panel A compares this word frequency to the government share of US employment.
Panel B compares it to the management share of employment. From 1860–2000, the
time interval is decadal. From 2000 onward, the time interval is annual. For sources
and methods, see Section 6.
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the growth of government and large firms, free-market proponents reacted by
writing more frequently about the merits of small-scale competition. But despite
the increasing prevalence of their ideas, free-market thinkers were unable to stop
the growth of government and large firms. If this interpretation is correct, then
free-market ideas do have an atomistic effect. It is just that this thinking failed
to catch hold.
There is, however, another interpretation of the evidence. When we separate
a theory into a scientific and ideological component, there is no reason that
the two sides must connect. In other words, the ideological effect of a theory
(its effect on human behavior) can be different from the theory’s factual claims.
Free-market theory argues that small-scale competition is the most effective form
of social organization. But when put into action, perhaps free-market ideas do
the opposite of what they claim. Might free-market thinking foster the growth
of hierarchy? The evidence in Figure 12 suggests that this possibility is worth
exploring.
4.2 Belief systems as ‘massive fictions’
According to multilevel selection theory, social animals face a fundamental
dilemma. To be successful, social groups must suppress the selfish behavior of
individuals. The problem is that within the group, selfish behavior is advanta-
geous. David Sloan Wilson and E.O. Wilson call this dilemma the ‘fundamental
problem of social life’ (Wilson and Wilson, 2007). The existence of sociality, they
argue, is predicated on solving this problem.
Humans, it seems, have developed a way to motivate altruism that is unique.
We rely, at least in part, on the power of beliefs. Successful groups adopt belief
systems that motivate group cohesion (Turchin, 2016). Importantly, these beliefs
need not be scientifically true. As long as they motivate pro-social actions, beliefs
can be factually inaccurate — sometimes wildly so. For this reason, David Sloan
Wilson argues that belief systems are often ‘massively fictional’:
Groups governed by belief systems that internalize social control can
be much more successful than groups that must rely on external
forms of social control. For all of these (and probably other) rea-
sons, we can expect many belief systems to be massively fictional in
their portrayal of the world.
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(Wilson, 2010, emphasis added)
To solve the fundamental problem of social life, Wilson argues that belief
systems contain a (possibly universal) untruth. They portray altruistic behavior
as beneficial to the individual. In so doing, these belief-systems promote altru-
ism by denying the sacrifice that it necessarily (according to multilevel selection
theory) involves.
As an example of such a ‘massively fictional’ belief system, Wilson studies
the worldview of the Hutterites (a communal sect of Protestants living in north-
western North America). The Hutterite worldview, Wilson finds, contains no
grey areas (Wilson, 2015). Actions are portrayed as either good for both indi-
viduals and groups, or bad for both individuals and groups. By masking the costs
of altruism, this belief system may help Hutterites motivate communal behavior.
Interestingly, Wilson finds a striking parallel between the communal beliefs
of the Hutterites and the libertarian (i.e. free-market) beliefs of Ayn Rand (Wil-
son, 2015). Like the Hutterites, Rand’s worldview seems to have no grey areas.
Actions are portrayed as either good for both individuals and the group, or bad
for both individuals and the group. There is, however, an important distinction
between the Hutterites’ beliefs and Rand’s libertarianism. The Hutterites por-
tray prosocial behavior (traits like ‘brotherliness’ and ‘mutual help’) as good for
both the individual and the group. Rand, in contrast, portrays antisocial behav-
ior (traits like ‘egoism’ and ‘selfishness’) as good for both the individual and the
group.
Noting this fact, Wilson argues that Rand’s worldview — and free-market
thinking in general — may be detrimental to group cohesion. This conclusion is
reasonable. But it presumes that free-market ideas (which are avowedly antiso-
cial) lead to antisocial behavior. It is possible, however, that the reverse might
be true. Free-market ideas might actually promote prosocial behavior by moti-
vating the formation of hierarchy.
4.3 Does free-market thinking motivate hierarchy?
Although we do not commonly think of them this way, hierarchical relations
involve altruism. In a hierarchical relation, one person submits to the will of
another. By doing so, the subordinate suppresses their own self-interest, and
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instead does what their superior commands. This is a form of altruism (Fix,
2019b). The question that concerns us here is — how do societies motivate this
submissive behavior?
An obvious way is to openly promote subservience. Societies that take this
route will promote submission as being beneficial to individuals. The Hutterites,
for instance, seem to do just that. Their belief system promotes ‘obedience’ and
‘surrender’ as good for both individuals and the group (Wilson, 2015). Other
religions similarly promote submission. Obsequium religiosum — religious sub-
mission — is a central tenet of Catholic dogma (Council, 1964). Confucianism
advocates tsun-wang — submission to authority (Wood, 1995). And in Islam,
‘submission’ is implied in the name of the faith itself (Lewis and Churchill, 2008).
To promote hierarchy, however, this appeal to submission must have an asym-
metry. To function, hierarchies require both submission and dominance. So be-
hind the appeal to submission, there must be an assumption that not everyone
submits. Some people must have the right to wield authority. In religious hi-
erarchies, this asymmetry is often maintained by appealing to the authority of
God. Everyone submits to the will of God, but not equally so. Some people —
those with power — claim to speak for (or derive their authority from) God. This
leads to doctrines like the ‘divine right of kings’ (Figgis, 1922). The pharaohs of
ancient Egypt went so far as to proclaim themselves gods (Collins, 2014).
Using the language of Michele Gelfand (2019), we might call the appeal to
submission the ‘tight’ approach to motivating hierarchy. It openly asks individu-
als to submit to authority. Is there a corresponding ‘loose’ approach to motivating
hierarchy? I propose that free-market thinking — with its emphasis on choice
and freedom (Friedman, 1962; Friedman and Friedman, 1990) — may be one
such ‘loose’ approach.
This claim appears, at first, to be contradictory. So-called ‘loose’ cultures
value freedom and autonomy, which are the opposite of hierarchy. It is possible,
however, for the idea of freedom to lead to its mirror opposite. The reason has
to do with the concept of ‘freedom’ itself.
In an important sense, ‘freedom’ is impossible among social animals. The
problem is that there are two types of freedom that, when applied to all individ-
uals, are contradictory. First, there is ‘freedom to’, which is about one’s ability
to enact one’s will. Second, there is ‘freedom from’, which is about one’s ability
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to avoid the undesirable actions of others. The two types of freedom contradict
one another. Everyone cannot, for instance, be free to be racist while also being
free from racism. One person’s ‘freedom to’ comes at the cost of another person’s
‘freedom from’.
Much like proclaiming that everyone should be submissive, advocating for
‘market freedom’ for all individuals is a contradiction. This, I believe, may be
how free-market thinking motivates hierarchy. When applied to the real world,
the ‘freedom’ of the free market is marked by an asymmetry. In abstract form,
free-market theory stands for the autonomy of individuals. But in more concrete
form, the theory stands for the autonomy of firms. This switch is apparent in
neoclassical economic theory. The theory proposes that ‘perfect competition’
(implying atomistic competition between individuals) is the ideal form of social
organization. But the same theory accepts that firms (which organize using
hierarchy) are the basic unit of production (Mankiw, 2012).
This switch from the autonomy of the individual to the autonomy of the
group, I propose, is how free-market ideas promote hierarchy. It is easiest to
see how this might work by applying the idea to ourselves. We use the word
‘free will’ to describe our own freedom to put conscious thoughts into action.
Yet when we look inside ourselves, the concept of ‘free will’ is contradictory. In-
dividual humans are a community of cooperating cells, organized in a hierarchy.
This means that our ‘free will’ is predicated on a large number of cells being
‘unfree’. If you are free to lift your arm at will, this requires that brain cells have
control over muscle cells. So the ‘free will’ of the individual is predicated on the
‘unfreedom’ of most of the individual’s constituents.
I propose that the same principle applies when free-market ideas are put
in action. While, in principle, they stand for the autonomy of the individual,
in practice they stand for the autonomy of business firms. By promoting this
autonomy, these ideas may implicitly legitimize the hierarchy within firms. The
‘freedom’ of the free market therefore translates into the power of firm owners
to command. It is ‘power in the name of freedom’8. This doublespeak may be
why free-market thinking has spread at the very time that hierarchy appears to
have increased. Contrary to the theory’s scientific claim, the ideological effect
of free-market thinking may be to facilitate the growth of hierarchy.
This idea is speculative, but consistent with the available evidence on cultural
8I thank Jonathan Nitzan for suggesting to me the phrase ‘power in the name of freedom’.
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A.  Cultural individualism vs. management employment
B.  Cultural tightness vs. management employment
Figure 13: Cultures become more individualistic and looser as the number
of managers grows
I plot here measures of cultural beliefs (within countries) as they relate to the managers’
share of employment. Panel A shows Geert Hofstede’s (2010) ’individualism index’ — a
measure of individualistic psychology. Panel B shows Michele Gelfand’s (2004) index of
cultural ‘tightness’, where ‘tighter’ cultures have stronger norms and a lower tolerance
of deviant behavior. For sources and methods, see Section 6.
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beliefs. On that front, Figure 13 shows a curious trend. Countries with a more
individualistic psychology (as measured by Gerte Hofstede’s (2010) ‘individu-
alism index’) tend to have more managers. Similarly, countries with a ‘looser’
culture (as measured by Michele Gelfand’s (2004) index) also have more man-
agers.
This result clashes with common sense. One would think that an individ-
ualistic culture with loose norms ought to have less hierarchy. Yet the reverse
seems to be true. This evidence supports the idea that free-market thinking may
paradoxically serve to stoke the growth of hierarchy.
5 Conclusions
Peter Brown and Peter Timmerman argue that mainstream economics is an ‘or-
phaned discipline’. It is founded, they claim, on a “dated and unrevised meta-
physical and prescientific vision” that is “incompatible with what we know about
the universe and our place in it” (Brown and Timmerman, 2015). Looking at
free-market theory in the context of the modern understanding of evolution, this
assessment rings true.
Adam Smith’s concept of the invisible hand was a plausible hypothesis when
it was proposed more than two centuries ago (Smith, 1776). Given the state
of knowledge at the time, it seemed possible that self-interest, if properly chan-
neled, could benefit groups. But as our knowledge of evolution has progressed,
this hypothesis has grown steadily less plausible. The problem is that the major
transitions in evolution show a pattern that is the opposite of the invisible hand.
Rather than organize decentrally, each wave of group formation seems to use
at least some form of centralization. And rather than stoke the self-interest of
subcomponents, successful groups seem to suppress it. And they often do so by
using hierarchy.
Whether it is the symbiosis of the eukaryotic cell, the coordination in mul-
ticellular organisms, or the cooperation among eusocial animals, this pattern
seems to hold. Competition among subcomponents is suppressed using some
form of centralized organization. And yet, if the economic theory of free mar-
kets is correct, humans are the exception to the rule. We can organize, the theory
claims, not by suppressing competition within groups, but by stoking it.
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This claim becomes even more important if we consider that modern humans
may be the most recent major evolutionary transition. In the last 10,000 years
we have transitioned from being a social species that lived in groups of several
hundred (Dunbar, 1993, 2013; Hayden, 2001), to an ‘ultrasocial’ species living
in groups a million strong (Gowdy and Krall, 2013, 2014; Richerson and Boyd,
1998; Turchin, 2013). If we have accomplished this feat through decentralized
competition (as free-market theory claims is possible), then the evidence should
surround us. And since this transition has accelerated in the last half century
(McNeill and Engelke, 2016; Steffen et al., 2015), we need not look to the deep
past to study it. We can look at modern trends between nations.
Looking at these trends, the evidence suggests that human societies have
developed in a way that is consistent with the major evolutionary transitions of
the past. As societies industrialize (by using more energy), it seems they turn
not to decentralized competition, but to increasingly large-scale hierarchy.
Where, then, does this leave the neoclassical theory of free markets? A con-
servative conclusion is that the theory is inconsistent with the evidence. A more
radical conclusion is that free-market theory is best treated not as a scientific
theory, but as a belief system — a claim that heterodox political economists have
made many times (Arnsperger and Varoufakis, 2006; Backhouse, 2010; Heil-
broner, 1990; Hodgson, 2019; Hoover, 2003; Hunt, 2016; Martin, 1990; Nitzan
and Bichler, 2009; Samuels, 1992; Söderbaum, 2008).
If this more radical interpretation is true, then we must grapple with a para-
dox. Free-market theory advocates the autonomy of individuals. Yet the spread
of free-market thinking has happened at the very time that hierarchy seems to
have increased. A plausible explanation is that when implemented, free-market
ideas actually promote the growth of hierarchy. This could be because the belief
in free markets contains an inherent contradiction. It advocates for the auton-
omy of individuals, yet it assumes that production is done by autonomous firms.
The result has been that the autonomy of the firm suppresses, to some degree,
the autonomy of the individual. This idea is speculative, but worth investigating
further.
Given the evidence discussed in this paper, it may be time for evolutionary-
minded scientists to stop treating neoclassical economics as a competing frame-
work, and instead view it as a cultural artifact to be explained by evolutionary
theory.
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6 Sources and methods
All data and code for this paper are available at the Open Science Frame-
work: https://osf.io/gbvnh/. Code for the hierarchy model is available at
github: https://github.com/blairfix/energy_hierarchy_mod. R versions of the
hierarchy-model functions are available at https://github.com/blairfix/hmod.
6.1 Data sources
Communist/non-communist status. I classify a country as ‘communist’ if it
has, or once had, a regime that claimed to be Marxist–Leninist. See the supple-
mentary materials for a detailed list of sources.
Cultural tightness Data for cultural ‘tightness’ comes from Gelfand et al.
(2020) and can be downloaded from the Open Science Framework: https:
//osf.io/pc4ef/
Gelfand’s data was first reported in a 2010 paper. I assume that this was the
date of data gathering. I match Gelfand’s data (in Fig. 13) with the average
of the managers’ share of employment (within each country) over the period
1990-2010.
Energy use per capita. Data for energy use per capita comes from the World
Bank, series EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE. To these values I add an estimate for energy
consumed through food (2000 kcal per day).
Firm size. Data for firm size comes from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
(GEM), series ‘omnowjob’. To calculate firm size, I merge all data over the years
2001-2014. Because the GEM data over-represents large firms, I use only firms
with 1000 or fewer employees. For method details, see the Appendix in (Fix,
2017). Power-law exponents for firm-size distributions are estimated using the
R PoweRlaw package (Gillespie, 2014).
Free-market word frequency. Word frequency of free-market jargon is from
the Google Ngram corpus for American English.
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Government employment. Data for government employment comes from
ILOSTAT series GOV_LVL_PSE (all public sector employees). I divide this se-
ries by the size of the labor force reported in World Bank series SL.TLF.TOTL.IN.
Data for US government employment share (Fig. 12A) comes from:
• 1890 to 1928: Historical Statistics of the United States, Table Ba 470-477
• 1929 to present: Bureau of Economic Analysis series 6.8A-D (total persons
engaged in production)
Individualism Index. Data for the ‘individualism index’ comes from Hofstede
et al. (2010). In addition to measures for specific countries, Hofstede reports
measures for the following regions: (1) Arab countries; (2) East Africa; and (3)
West Africa. Based on Hofstede’s notes, I disaggregate these regions as follows:
• Arab countries = Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates
• East Africa = Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia
• West Africa = Ghana, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo
I assign each country Hofstede’s metric for the region.
According to Hofstede, most of his data was gathered in the late 1960s and
early 1970s (the dataset does not specify years). However, data for the manage-
ment share of employment does not begin until 1990. To match Hofstede’s data
with the management data (Fig. 13), I average the latter (within each country)
over the period 1990-2010.
Managers’ employment. International data for the management share of em-
ployment is from ILOSTAT Table TEM_OCU, series EMPoc1P. Data for the United
States (Fig. 12B) comes from:
• 1860 to 1990: Historical Statistics of the United States, Table Ba 1033-
1046
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• 1990 to present: Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Population Survey
series LNU02032453 (management employment) divided by Bureau of
Economic Analysis series 6.8D (total persons engaged in production)
6.2 Hierarchy-model equations
The hierarchy model used in this paper is based on equations derived indepen-
dently by Herbert Simon (1957) and Harold Lydall (1959). In this model, hi-
erarchies have a constant span of control. We assume that there is one person
in the top rank. The total membership in the hierarchy is then given by the
following geometric series:
NT = 1+ s+ s
2+ ...+ sn−1 (12)
Here n is the number of ranks, s is the span of control, and NT is the total





In my model of hierarchy, the input is the hierarchy size NT and the span of
control s. To model the hierarchy, we must first estimate the number of hierar-







Here bc denotes rounding down to the nearest integer.
Next we need to calculate N1 — the employment in the bottom hierarchical
rank. To do this, we rewrite Eq. 12, this time building the hierarchy from the
bottom up. Starting with the bottom rank N1, membership in each consecutive
rank declines by a factor of 1/s. That means the hierarchy’s total membership














Sources and methods 50





















Sometimes rounding errors cause total employment of the modeled hierar-
chy to depart slightly from the size of the original inputted institutions. When
this happens I add/subtract members from the bottom rank to correct the er-
ror. The model is implemented numerically in C++, using the Armadillo linear
algebra library (Sanderson and Curtin, 2016).
6.3 Modeling Managers
I model managers as all individuals in and above rank 3. In a firm with n hi-
erarchical levels, the number of managers is equivalent to the membership in a






By dividing Eq. 19 by Eq. 13, we can find the management share of employment
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6.4 Finding the best-fit energy-hierarchy model
To find the model parameters that best fit the trends in empirical data (inset
Fig. 9 and Fig. 10), I first group the model results in log-spaced bins by energy
use. (This smooths the stochastic noise that is built into the model.) In each
bin, I calculate the average energy use and the average of the statistic of inter-
est (either the management share of employment or the government share of
employment). I then interpolate linearly between these averaged points, creat-
ing a function that relates energy use to the government/management share of
employment. I use this numerical function to compute the error between the
model and the raw empirical data. The error function is:
ε= (logSr− logSm)
2 (21)
Here Sr is the real-world statistic (either government or management share of
employment) and Sm is the model statistic. The best-fit model minimizes this
error.
6.5 Fitting the energy-hierarchy model to individual countries
To infer the degree of hierarchy within countries (Fig. 11), I first fit the energy-
hierarchy model to data for individual countries. For each country-year obser-
vation, I chose the model iteration that minimizes the following error function:
ε= (log Er− log Em)
2+(log Mr− log Mm)
2 (22)
Here Er and Em are energy use per capita in the real-world country and the
model, respectively. Mr and Mm are the management share of employment in
the real-world country and model, respectively. Because the energy-hierarchy
model is stochastic, I choose the 10 best-fit iterations, and average the measured
degree of hierarchy across these models. I then infer that the degree of hierarchy
found in the real-world country is the same as found in the model.
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6.6 Calculating the degree of hierarchy in the energy-hierarchy
model
To calculate the degree of hierarchy in the energy-hierarchy model, I assume
that power relations exist only within institutions. In other words, there are no
power relations between institutions.
It is worth noting that this assumption is not realistic. Studies of corporate
ownership suggest that between firms, there is an interlocking network of power
(Fichtner et al., 2017; Glattfelder and Battiston, 2009; Vitali et al., 2011). I
ignore this complexity here for two reasons. First, it is beyond the scope of
the energy-hierarchy model to simulate the network of power between firms.
Second, this network is ignored by the neoclassical theory of free markets. In
the neoclassical model, firms interact only by buying and selling, so there are no
power relations between them.
In my energy-hierarchy model, then, I give neoclassical theory the benefit of
the doubt. I assume that power-relations exist only within firms, not between
them. Were we to add power relations between firms, the inferred degree of
hierarchy would increase.
One more caveat. The energy-hierarchy model does not directly simulate
the chain of command within hierarchies. Instead, it simulates aggregate hierar-
chical structure — the number of people in each rank. To calculate the number
of subordinates controlled by an individual, I assign each modeled person the






Here h is the hierarchical rank, N is the membership in each rank, and N s is
the average number of subordinates. I then input the distribution of N s into
the formulas for the concentration of hierarchical power (Eqs. 1–2) and global
reaching centrality (Eqs. 3–4).
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6.7 Differences between CHP and GRC
My two metrics of hierarchy — the concentration of hierarchical power (CHP)
and global reaching centrality (GRC) — both agree that the ‘least hierarchical’
network is one in which nobody has subordinates. But the two metrics disagree
about what type of network is the ‘most hierarchical’.
The GRC assumes that the most hierarchical network is one in which all
people are directly under the command of a single person. This is a society
consisting of a single hierarchical firm, in which the CEO directly commands
everyone else.
Whether such a society is indeed the ‘most hierarchical’ is a matter of defini-
tion. In an engineering scenario (where the GRC is derived), it makes sense to
define the most hierarchical network as one in which a single node directly con-
trols all other nodes. But in human networks, this idea makes less sense. The
problem is that in practice, as humans accumulate more direct subordinates,
their ability to actually command any single person diminishes. An army gen-
eral may easily command 10 officers. But can the same general manage 10,000
soldiers directly? Unlikely.
As humans try to directly manage more people, their subordinates become
more autonomous. We have a word for this tendency. As the span of control
increases, we say that the hierarchy becomes ‘flatter’. To many people, a flatter
organization is ‘less hierarchical’. But the GRC assumes the reverse is true. That
is why my other metric — the ‘concentration of hierarchical power’ (CHP) — is
useful. In contrast to the GRC, the CHP views a steeper organization as more
hierarchical.
Because the CRC and CHP disagree about what constitutes the ‘most hierar-
chical network’, they could give conflicting results for the trend in social hier-
archy. One metric might increase while the other decreases. Fortunately, I do
not find such a conflict (Fig. 11). The reason the two metrics agree is because
their differing definitions matter only when societies approach a single hierar-
chy. Since no real-world society is close to this limit, the CHP and GRC show a
consistent trend.
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6.8 Verifying the energy-hierarchy model’s span of control
In the energy-hierarchy model, the span of control is a free parameter that varies
between model iterations. One way to test the model is to see if the fitted values
for the span of control are consistent with observations from real-world firms.
To conduct this test, I use Eq. 22 to find the model iteration that best fits the
observed relation (within countries) between energy use and the management
share of employment. I then take the fitted values for the span of control and
compare them to real-world studies of hierarchy within firms. Figure 14 shows
the results. The model’s estimates for the span of control have a range that is
consistent with the real-world observations. A t-test (p= 0.77) and ks-test (p=
0.08) both indicate that the two distributions are statistically indistinguishable
at the 5% level.
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Figure 14: Span of control — empirical data and model estimates
The red distribution shows density estimates for the span of control in the available
studies of firm hierarchy. Data is from Ariga et al. (1992); Audas et al. (2004); Baker
et al. (1993); Bell and Van Reenen (2012); Dohmen et al. (2004); Eriksson (1999);
Heyman (2005); Lima (2000); Morais and Kakabadse (2014); Mueller et al. (2016);
Rajan and Wulf (2006); Treble et al. (2001). Because these studies report data over
differing timeframes, I first average the spans reported by each study. I then plot the
distribution of these averages. The black points on the x-axis show the individual av-
erages. The blue distribution shows density estimates for the span of control fitted by
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